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Stemming from politically given market imperfections in a trad-
able permits system, this paper develops a Stackelberg game with two
types of non-cooperative agents to describe how a large -potentially
dominant- agent may exercise market power at the expense of a com-
petitive fringe.
In a dynamic framework with full forward and backward temporal
ﬂexibility (i.e. 1:1 Intertemporal Trading Ratio), this intra-industry
model then suggests an optimal allocation criterion for grandfathered
permits based on recent emissions.
This paper contributes to the permit trading literature by shedding
some light on the decision to allow banking and borrowing, a debate
which is typically overlooked by the debate to introduce the permits
market itself among other environmental regulation tools. Provisional
results are presented under perfect information.
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1 Introduction
What happens on a tradable permits market when distortions occur as a
consequence of the inital allocation? Whereas Hahn (1984) contributed ﬁrst
to this debate by demonstrating the non neutrality of permits allocation for
an agent able to exert market power1 in a static context and concerning the
spatial exchange of permits only, this paper addresses the critical aspect of
initial permits allocation in a dynamic context and concerning intertemporal
emissions trading. Theoretical analyses remain scarce in this domain, even
if the properties of banking (i.e. the ability to stock permits for future use)
and borrowing (i.e. the ability to borrow permits from future periods) have
been detailed. In a continuous time model under certainty, Rubin (1996)
shows that an intertemporal equilibrium exists on a permits market from
the viewpoint of the regulator and the ﬁrm, and that banking and borrowing
allow ﬁrms to smooth emissions. Under uncertainty, Schennach (2000) shows
the permits price may rise at a rate less than the discount rate and new public
information may cause jumps in the price and emissions paths, among other
major contributions.
This article builds on the intertemporal emissions trading literature with
market imperfections. It aims at ﬁlling the gap in the literature between
the pros and cons of authorizing banking and borrowing in permit trading
programs, a topic which is typically not enough debated when deciding to
adopt such an environmental regulation system. Against this background, it
attempts to shed some light on the ability of a large agent to move dynamic
markets when permits are grandfathered.
Liski & Montero (2005b) study the eﬀect of market power on the equi-
librium of a permits market by introducing a large potentially dominant and
a competitive fringe. Based upon two cases, their analysis reveals ﬁrst that
the large agent might manipulate the market by banking allowances when
it owns all the stock of permits and second when the fringe receives all the
stock of permits, the large agent has an incentive to exchange permits at the
competitive price and to build a permits bank for the next period. While
previous papers restricted their analysis to banking only2, both banking and
borrowing are allowed without restrictions in a continuous time setting.
The model brings to the regulatory economics literature a realistic de-
scription of relationships between agents on a tradable permits market with
information asymmetry. As Liski & Montero (2005b) did not impose a par-
1For an exhaustive literature review on permits trading and market power, see Petrakis
& Xepapadeas (2003).
2This was mainly due to the fact that no major international agreement on greenhouse
gases allows borrowing to a full extent to date (personal contacts with M. Liski).2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 4
ticular game structure, I adopt a Stackelberg game structure that allows to
deal with speciﬁc interactions between two types of agents: a leader with an
informational advantage associated to a large agent, and a follower associated
to a competitive fringe.
The market imperfection arises from the free distribution of permits on
the basis of past emissions, while the product market is assumed to remain
competitive3. I explicitly include the Hotelling conditions4 that must apply
if permits are considered as an exhaustible resource.
The paper unfolds as follows: ﬁrst, I describe the institutional environ-
ment of current permit trading programs, namely the Kyoto Protocol (KP)
and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS); second I de-
rive in a benchmark case an expression for market power; third I develop the
Stackelberg game; fourth I suggest an optimal allocation criterion to correct
for these market imperfections5.
2 Description of the Institutional Environment
In this section, I describe how the model hinges on critical design issues of
existing international emissions trading schemes, namely the KP and the EU
ETS. I also attempt to provide a balanced picture of the EU ETS and KP
market power concerns.
2.1 The Kyoto Protocol
The question of the Kyoto Protocol as an "unﬁnished business" is often
evoked. Very heterogenous sectors were included under the same regulation,
which could be detrimental to ﬁnd the right method to allocate permits
depending on price elasticities between sectors.
The intra-industry structure adopted in this paper may be seen as a
simpliﬁcation of the KP. Yet it may propose useful policy recommendations
when dealing with such an international scheme. I focus on the negotiation
phase, the special case of Russia and the prospective use of banking and
borrowing.
3For the distinction between permits market and industry structure imperfections, see
Sartzetakis (1997) and Sartzetakis (2004)
4Namely the exhaustion and terminal conditions.
5See Eyckmans & Coenen (2006) for an introduction to the debate.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 5
2.1.1 Negotiation phase
In the context of the KP, the case of countries supplied with allocations in
excess of their actual needs has been coined as Hot Air in the literature6.
The distribution of a large number of permits to Former Soviet Union (FSU)
and Eastern Europe countries (Russia, the Ukraine forming two thirds) may
be seen indeed as an imperfection of the KP, as those countries were given
generous allocations to foster agreement during the ﬁrst phase (2008-2012).
Market power concerns arise as industrial ﬁrms may beneﬁt from the gap
between the initial permits allocation (based on 1990 production levels) and
their real emission needs in 2008 (after a period of recession), and the use of
these permits surpluses remains unclear.
This situation emerged as a conﬂict between the internal and the external
consistency of the permits market:
• the internal consistency refers to the situation where agents freely re-
ceive or bid for permits according to their real needs. The regulator
may be interested however in distributing more permits to a coun-
try than strictly needed (according to business as usual emissions or a
benchmark for instance) in order to ensure participation to the permits
market7. As a consequence, one agent may achieve a dominant position
which in turns threatens the eﬃciency of the permits market itself.
• the external consistency of the permits market is linked to the broader
debate of climate change as the purchase of a ”global public good”8.
This altruistic view embodies the notions of ”burden sharing” or ”diﬀer-
entiated responsibilities” attached to the KP, whereby developed coun-
tries agree to spend a higher income share on ﬁghting climate change
than developing countries9.
Those conﬂicting views undermine the negotiation of the cap, which is
ﬁxed at a suboptimal level compared to what would be needed to minimize
the total damage to the environment. Greenhouse gases (GHG) emission
targets under the KP represents a mere 5% reduction below 1990 levels. Now
if early movers like EU countries are willing to ratchet down the cap, little
6See Baron (1999), Burniaux (1999), Bernard et al. (2003), Bohringer & Loshel (2003),
Holtsmark (2003).
7Such negotiation with Russia was determinant for the KP to enter into force on
16/02/05
8See Guesnerie (2006).
9Note that the implicit assumptions of the existence of such an Environmental Kuznets
Curve (the environment is a superior good and environmental regulation becomes stricter
through time at higher levels of GDP per capita) is left out of the debate.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 6
progress can be achieved without luring in major players like the USA, India
and China. Thus, many diﬃculties arise to pierce the "veil of uncertainty"
around international negotiation10.
Uncertainty also aﬀects trading rules that will be eﬀectively implemented
at the international level. As Klepper & Peterson (2005)11 put it:”The Ky-
oto Protocol and its related decisions do not explicitly state who is actually
supposed to be trading. Probably we will observe both government and ﬁrm
trading. Under the former, market power might indeed become a relevant
issue”.
The fact that setting up a permits market might give some countries the
opportunity to draw a ﬁnancial advantage without a direct environmental
gain (i.e. in the absence of eﬀective emissions abatement) might be puzzling.
But as stated in Maeda (2003)12, ”[This debate] seems misguided because it
focuses on the political importance of the issue, rather than addressing it from
an economic perspective.”
Overall, the hypothesis that generous allocations that broaden the scope
of a cap-and-trade program might also give birth to dominant positions shall
not be neglected. This leads me to comment the case of Russia more in
depth.
2.1.2 Will Russia be a net seller of permits?
Russia seems the best example to investigate potential market power within
the KP according to Korppoo et al. (2006)13: ”Given the collapse of its
emissions in the course of its economic transition, Russia is the country with
by far the largest potential surplus of emission allowances for sale under the
Kyoto international trading mechanisms. It is also generally considered to
be the country with the greatest potential for continuing emission-reducing
improvements in energy eﬃciency. Indeed, in the ﬁrst commitment period
under the Kyoto Protocol it could be described as the Saudi Arabia of the
emerging carbon market, with the potential to try to manipulate the market
through strategic decisions as to when and how it releases it surplus - if there
are buyers willing to deal.”
Empirical evidence gathered by Grubb (2004), Liski & Montero (2005a)14





14Based on the MIT-EPPA database that aggregates FSU countries.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 7
during the ﬁrst phase of the KP. Diﬀerent projections for Russian CO2 emis-






Russian Energy Strategy 2000 76-93 2012
IEAa World Energy Outlook 2004 72 2008-2012
CEPAbc 2004 75 2008-2012
Table 1: A Survey of Projections for Russian Carbon Dioxide Emissions.
Source: adapted from Korpoo et al. (2006)
aInternational Energy Agency.
bCambridge Economic Policy Associates.







Russian Ministry of Economic
Development and Tradeb
2003 408-545 2008-2012
Russian Forecast to the UNFCCCc 2003 456-913 2008-2012
CEPA 2004 400 2008-2012
Klepper-Peterson 2005 410 2010
Bohringer et al. 2006 246d 2008-2012
Table 2: A Survey of Projections for Russia’s Surplus under the KP. Source:
author
aIn million tonnes of carbon equivalent (MtCe).
badapted from Korpoo et al. (2005)
cadapted from Korpoo et al. (2005)
dMtCO2
The key ﬁnding in Table 1 is that under all scenarios Russia would meet
its Kyoto targets, as its CO2 emissions projections consistently hit below
1990 levels. The room for interpretation of Table 2 is limited by the wide
variation in surplus estimates with a lowest value of 246 MtCO2 found by
Bohringer et al. (2006) and, as expressed above, by the current absence of
clearly deﬁned international trading rules to monetize such a surplus. Further
projections regarding Russia’s own energy demand after the ﬁrst period of2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 8
the KP are neeeded to determine whether Russian industrial ﬁrms might be
able to aﬀect negatively other members’ marginal abatement costs.
2.1.3 Prospective use of banking and borrowing in the KP
This section oﬀers a description of the possible use of banking borrowing in
the KP. On the one hand, provisions on banking are explicited by Klepper
& Peterson (2005)15: ”Assigned amount units (AAUs) resulting from the
Kyoto commitment can be banked without a time constraint. Credits from
Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can
be banked up to a limit of , respectively, 2.5% and 5% of a Party’s initial
assigned amount. Sink credits can not be banked”.
On the other hand, implicit provisions on borrowing may be found in
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC
(2000)) report16. As explained by Newell et al. (2005)17: ”International
climate policy discussions have implicitly included borrowing within possible
consequences for noncompliance under the Kyoto Protocol, through the pay-
back of excess tons with a penalty (i.e., interest).”
As stated earlier, this issue remains unclear and reveals a lack of a speciﬁc
debate on the pros and the cons to allow banking and / or limited borrowing,
if not a lack of theoretical grounding.
2.2 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
Here I draw comments on two critical aspects of the EU ETS. First, I deal
with possible design ﬂaws in the allocation of permits that might pave the
way for dominant positions during the ﬁrst phase. Second, I provide an
overview of the prospective use of banking and borrowing.
2.2.1 Over-allocation or relative success?
The EU ETS gently constrains emissions (8% reduction for EU-15) so as
to start with a low carbon price. Yet the public debate has shifted toward
a possible over-allocation of permits during the ﬁrst phase. The production
decisions of private actors are under scrutiny: do permits surpluses constitute
a relative success (i.e. ﬁrms have reduced their emissions above projected
levels) or an imperfection in the design of the system?
15p.295
16paragraph II.XV
17p.1492 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 9
Figure 1: EU ETS National Allocation Plans - Phase 1 (2005-2007) Source:
Caisse Des Depots et Consignations (CDC, 2006)2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 10
Figure 1 represents the repartition of 2005 European Union Allowance
Units (EUAs) among countries, where Germany, Poland and the UK stand
out as the most important actors by totalling about two thirds of the total
allowances. Data is taken from CDC (2006)18. While it is not our goal
to comment on the structure of the European carbon market here, it seems
interesting to look at the possible surplus those countries were endowed with.
Figure 2 depicts the 2005 reported emissions and, if any, the size of the
surplus. The sum of the two bars is equivalent to the 2005 allocation of
permits for a given country. It reﬂects a wide variety of cases among market
participants as a bulk of countries (France, the Netherlands, Finland, Slo-
vaquia, Sweden) was able to build a permits surplus above 15%, while Greece
is short of permits. Surpluses also reﬂect in a limited amount reserves for
new entrants, which are included in the data used .
Table 3 takes a closer look at the allowances surpluses in million tonnes
of CO2 and in percentage of the allocation. Its main ﬁnding lies in the
fact that most countries seemed to favor generous allocations during the
ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS19. The biggest player, Germany does not seem
to be in a position to exert market power with little more than 5% excess
allowances. The surplus of Poland need not be overstated either since the use
of 10% of allowances is missing in the Community Independent Transaction
Log (CITL) administered by the European Commission. Germany, UK, and
Portugal form a group of countries where the regulator strived to allocate
optimally. On the contrary, stricter emissions reductions were enforced in
the case of Ireland and Greece.
How could one explain those contrasting patterns in actual emissions for
EU ETS participants in 2005? Part of the answer may be found in the de-
cision making process within each National Allocation Plan (NAP). Godard
(2003) and Godard (2005) describe the logic behind the French NAP when
allocating shares of recent emissions baselines: non-electric utilities were sup-
plied with their projected need in permits, while electric utilities were more
constrained. This situation may be justiﬁed by the perceived abatement
potential of the electricity industry, but it reveals overall the necessary arbi-
trages to be made due to sector heterogeneity and a stringent cap.
Due to a lack of data availability from 2004 onwards, it appears diﬃcult to
18Tendances Carbone is published by the French Caisse des Depots and is available at
<http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/>, accessed on November, 24th
19Apart from the EU ETS, there is a need to be cautious here with the notions of ”over
allocating” and conversely ”under-allocating” permits depending on the country. Their
meaning depends on the reference point (business as usual plus some abatement for in-
stance). If other trading schemes implement per capita distribution for instance, it may
appear less relevant to talk about ”over allocation”.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 11
Figure 2: EU ETS 2005 Reported Emissions and Size of the Surplus Source:
CDC (2006)2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 12














Table 3: Size of the Surplus among EU ETS Participants in 2005. Source:
CDC (2006)
aData for Cyprus is missing.
bEuropean Union Allocation in MtCO2
cThis surplus needs to take into account 10% of allowances whose emissions have not
been reported yet.
dA negative value refers to an actual excess in the level of emissions with respect to
the cap.3 THE MODEL 13
provide a more precise characterization of the room for market power at the
sectoral level. For French installations subject to the Directive 2003/87/CE,
an estimation based on 1,402 installations totalling 185,3 MtCO2 taken from
the Register for Polluting Emissions (iREP)20 reveals almost 50% of permits
were distributed to four players, and the ﬁrst ten permits holder sum up to
60% of permits allocation. Each of this big players might exert a dominant
position on its own sector if permits are distributed freely based on recent
emissions, as modelled in this paper.
2.2.2 Prospective use of banking and borrowing in the EU ETS
Member states may allow banking without restriction. But this possibility
to carry over EUAs from from 2005-2007 to 2008-2012 in the EU ETS is
very limited in practice. Only France and Poland have allowed it to a certain
extent, i.e. permits that were bought cannot be banked. Besides, only ”green”
ﬁrms that have eﬀectively reduced emissions may bank allowances in Poland.
This section provided an overview of two major permits market along
with their allocation rules. This background information is used as the basis
for the modelling of a diﬀerential game with hierarchical play in the paper.
3 The Model
This section details the features of the model. First, I explain the design of
the cap-and-trade program. Second, I examine the industry and information
structures. Third, I deﬁne an intertemporal emissions trading constraint.
Fourth, I express the Hotelling conditions. Finally, I explicit the properties
of the abatement cost function.
3.1 Design of the Cap-and-Trade Program
The regulator sets a cap E on emissions of a given pollutant that corresponds
to a speciﬁc environmental goal. The ﬁx endowment is therefore exogenous
to the model, and may be broken down into individual permits allocation ei
mandatory for each agent i.
Agent [i = 1] is a large polluting agent, who is initially allocated a large
number of permits. Agents [i = 2,...N] aggregate many small polluting
agent, who sare assumed to be comparatively smaller permits-holders. The
20The iREP is monitored by the Minister of the Environment and displays public in-
formation at <http://www.pollutionsindustrielles.ecologie.gouv.fr/IREP/index.php> (ac-
cessed on November, 24th 2006).3 THE MODEL 14
premise of the paper is that the large agent might be able to exercise market
power.
Permits are distributed freely on the basis of recent emissions21. Agents
may bank and borrow permits without restrictions. We do not include the
eﬀects of allowing a safety valve22 in the model.
3.2 Industry Structure
This partial equilibrium model features an intra-industry permit market in
an homogenous single good economy. In what follows, I tend to neglect the
interaction with the output market. An agent may be either a country, a ﬁrm
or a cartel23. The competitive market price is determined by fringe agents’
abatement costs.
3.3 Information Structure
I model a diﬀerential game24 played in continuous time where all players have
the possibility of inﬂuencing the rate of change of the permits bank through
the choice of their current actions. It is therefore assumed that they adopt a
Markovian strategy.
The common knowledge includes the fact that all players need to comply
to the environmental constraint exogenously set by the regulator. The game
unfolds in two steps. First, I derive the follower’s reaction function to any
action announced by the leader through fringe agents’ cost minimization
21See Ellerman & Wing (2003) for a review concerning the use of projections, bench-
marking and intensity targets. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to study the
relative merits of grandfathering and auctioning, theoretical analyses stress the superiority
of auctioning as in Jouvet et al. (2005). In the view of the Public Choice Theory, free
allocation of permits may also be seen by some ﬁrms as a means to extract more permits
as a scarcity rent, and therefore lobbying takes place. But it is also imposes liabilities on
ﬁrms that will be reﬂected in their balance sheets. As highlighted by Raymond (1996), ini-
tial permits allocation reveals social norms embedded by newly created permits. The free
distribution of permits may be seen as an entitlement over an environmental resource. As
conceptions evolve and auctioning might become predominant, the question arises whether
the probability of achieving a dominant position will increase or decrease.
22A safety valve may be deﬁned as an hybrid instrument to limit the cost of capping
emissions at some target level whereby the regulator oﬀers to sell permits in whatever
quantity at a pre-determined price.
23For instance, within the KP permits may be exchanged party-to-party, but also ﬁrm-
to-ﬁrm if Annex B members delegate this ability to private actors. In the third case,
collusive behaviours may appear either between parties or between ﬁrms. (Liski & Montero
(2005b))
24See Dockner et al. (2000) for an overview of diﬀential games.3 THE MODEL 15
problem at the competitive price. Second, I observe how the the leader might
exercise market power as large agent integrates the reaction function into his
own cost minimization problem, and decides how to adjust his emissions
level. I hold all other parameters constant25.
3.4 Intertemporal Emissions Trading
Let Bi(t) be the permits bank, with Bi(t) > 0 in case of banking and
Bi(t) < 0 in case of borrowing.
Any change in the permits bank is equal to the diﬀerence between ei(t)
and ei(t), respectively agent’s i permits allocation and his emission level at
time t. The banking borrowing constraint may be written as:
˙ Bi(t) = ei(t) − ei(t) (1)
with Bi(0) = 0 and Bi(T) ≥ 0 as banking and borrowing are assumed to be
always allowed26.
3.5 Hotelling Conditions
Notwithstanding diﬀerences between a permit and an exhaustible resource27,
it is assumed in the literature that the Hotelling conditions for exhaustible
resources must apply on a permits market. Consequently, the terminal and
exhaustion conditions are detailed below.
3.5.1 Terminal Condition
Let [0,T] be the continuous time planning horizon28. At time T, cumulated
emissions must be equal to the sum of each agent’s depollution objective and
25For instance, agents do not incur information costs.
26See Rubin (1996), p. 272
27According to Liski & Montero (2006) (p.3), the following diﬀerences may be high-
lighted. First, in a permits market with banking, the market may remain after the ex-
haustion of the bank; while the market of a non-renewable resource vanishes after the
last unit extraction. Second, permits extraction and storage costs are equal to zero; while
those costs are generally positive for a non-renewable resource. Third, the demand for an
extra permit usually comes from a derived demand of other ﬁrms that also hold permits;
while the demand for an extra unit of a non-renewable resource comes more often from a
derived demand of another actor (e.g., a consumer).
28This planning period seems appropriate for a theoretical study of intertemporal emis-
sions trading. Alternative time settings including distinct phases may be found in Montero
& Ellerman (1998), Schennach (2000) or Ellerman & Montero (2002), but they reﬂect the
speciﬁc requirements of the Acid Rain Program (USA).3 THE MODEL 16








ei = E (2)
3.5.2 Exhaustion Condition
At time T, there is no more permit in the bank (either stocked or borrowed):
N X
i=1
Bi(T) = 0 (3)
Those conditions ensure that agents gradually meet their depollution ob-
jective so that the marginal cost of depollution is equalized in present value
over the time period, and the permits bank clears in the end.
3.6 Abatement Cost Function
Let Ci[ei(t)] be the abatement cost function30 incurred by agent i in order
to comply with his permits allocation ei. Ci[ei(t)] is deﬁned on <2 in <
continuous and is of class C2[0;T], i.e. twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The
classical assumption31 of strictly increasing abatement costs leads Ci[ei(t)] to
be convex, with C0
i[ei(t)] < 0 and C00
i [ei(t)] > 0. I can set Ci[ei(0)] = 0.
Agent’s i marginal abatement costs (MAC) are associated with a one-unit
reduction from his emission level ei at time t and are noted −C0
i[ei(t)] > 0.
At the equilibrium of a permits market in a static framework32, price-taking





Thus, at the equilibrium, there is no arbitrage for price-taking agents.
29See also Leiby & Rubin (2001), p. 231.
30Compared to a situation where proﬁts are unconstrained, abatement costs appear in
order to meet the emission cap ei.
31Stated ﬁrst by Montgomery (1972). The conditions given by Leiby & Rubin (2001)
include the output q(t) where Ci[qi(t),ei(t),t] is strongly convex with C0
i[qi(t)] > 0 and
C00
i [qi(t)] > 0. Properties of non-convex abatement cost functions may be found in Godby
(2000).
32See Hahn (1984).4 BENCHMARK CASE 17
4 Benchmark Case
In order to reveal the conditions under which the large agent may exercise
market power, I develop in the ﬁrst section a benchmark case where the large
agent receives all the stock of permits.
4.1 Optimization program
The expression of market power may be derived straightforward when the
large agent owns all the stock of permits, and directly integrates the com-
petitive price into his maximization program. In this setting, fringe agents’
emissions come from trading with the large agent. To simplify notations in
this section, let y1(t) be the number of permits distributed to the large agent.
The large agent behaves as follows:

             
























































































− λ(t) = 04 BENCHMARK CASE 18
Replacing λ(t) = C0
1[e1(t)] in the second equation, dropping the time sub-






















































































εi measures the relative variation between an additional unit of emission
and the acceleration of marginal cost. A high elasticity (in absolute value)
induces a strong link between the two variables.
4.2 Market Power Condition





ei(t) = εi y1(t) (5)
Due to the convexity assumption, fringe agents’ elasticity is negative,
and reveals the possibility for the leader to aﬀect negatively fringe agents’
behaviour.
The large agent’s MAC is therefore lower than under perfect competition,
since he enjoys a dominant position.
Overall, the large agent may be characterized as a net gainer and fringe
agents as net losers in this setting.5 FRINGE AGENTS’ REACTION FUNCTION 19
5 Fringe Agents’ Reaction Function
The ﬁrs step of the game consists in forming the strategy of the fringe. Fringe
agents choose their optimal emissions level according to the possibility to
bank and borrow permits in constraint (1). The cost minimization program
may be written as follows:

    






−rt {Ci[ei(t)] + P(t) [ei(t) − ei(t)]}dt
˙ Bi(t) = ei(t) − ei(t)
Bi(0) = 0, Bi(T) ≥ 0
Ci[ei(0)] = 0
where the expression [ei(t) − ei(t)] represents the number of permits bought
(> 0) or sold (< 0).
I write the corresponding current-value Hamiltonian and ﬁrst-order opti-
mality conditions:
H(Bi(t),ei(t),λ(t),t) = {Ci[ei(t)] + P(t) [ei(t) − ei(t)]} − λ(t)[ei(t) − ei(t)]
∂H
∂ei(t)
= 0 : P(t) = −C
0




= 0 : ˙ Bi(t) = ei(t) − ei(t) (7)
˙ λ(t) − rλ(t) = −
∂H
∂Bi(t)
= 0, λ(T)Bi(T) = 0 (8)
Note that the transversality condition in (8), required to meet the ex-
haustion condition (3), is a suﬃcient optimality condition. The bank has no
scrap value at the end of the period.
It can be infered from (8) that λ(t) = λ(0)ert. When fringe agents build
a permits bank in terminal period, {Bi(T) > 0,λ(T) = 0,λ(t) = 0}. The
reaction function is therefore equal to the static equilibrium condition (4)
where fringe agents equalize their MAC with the permits price.
Conversely, the reaction function is equal to (6) when fringe agents do
not keep permits in the bank in terminal period and the constraint on λ is
binding.
I now turn to the large agent’s behaviour and to how he integrates the
two possible cases of reaction function into his own optimization program.6 BEHAVIOUR OF THE LARGE AGENT 20
6 Behaviour of the Large Agent
6.1 Optimization program
The large agent adjusts strategically his optimal emissions levels according
to its initial allocation e1 as expressed by (2) and the banking borrowing
constraint (1). The cost minimization program for agent [i = 1] is:

         






−rt {C1[e1(t)] + Pt [e1(t) − e1(t)]} dt










B1(0) = 0, B1(T) ≥ 0
C1[e1(0)] = 0
6.2 First case
Replacing Pt by (4), the large agent’s optimization program becomes:

         






−rt {C1[e1(t)] − C
0
i[ei(t)] [e1(t) − e1(t)]} dt










Bi(0) = 0, Bi(T) ≥ 0
C1[e1(0)] = 0
Assuming fringe agents are homogenous, I write
PN
i=2 ei(t) = (N −1)ei(t)
and replace the emissions constraint (2) into the objective function:

    


















˙ B1(t) = e1(t) − e1(t)
Bi(0) = 0, Bi(T) ≥ 0
C1[e1(0)] = 0
I form the corresponding current-value Hamiltonian with e1(t) as a control








[e1(t) − e1(t)] + µ(t)[e1(t) − e1(t)]6 BEHAVIOUR OF THE LARGE AGENT 21





























= 0 : ˙ B1(t) = e1(t) − e1(t) (10)
˙ µ(t) − rµ(t) = −
∂H
∂B1(t)
= 0, µ(T)B1(T) = 0 (11)
If {B1(T) > 0,µ = 0}, the large agent also builds a permits bank in
terminal period. From (9), it is possible to identify an analogous version of

























In comparison with the benchmark case where the large agent owns all
the stock of permits, in the case where both types of agents keep a permits
bank in the end, the large agent is able to aﬀect fringe agent’s MAC through
the number of permits he holds in excess of his emissions.
6.3 Second case
In the second case, replacing Pt by (6), the large agent’s optimization program
becomes:

         






−rt {C1[e1(t)] − {C
0
i[ei(t)] + λ(t)} [e1(t) − e1(t)]} dt










Bi(0) = 0, Bi(T) ≥ 0
C1[e1(0)] = 07 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERMITS ALLOCATION 22





















This condition means that when fringe agents do not build a permits bank in
the end, the large agent is still able to aﬀect negatively fringe agent’s MAC.
Both values of µ(t) and λ(t) are known. For the large agent, the shadow
value of a unit of emission in the bank measures the marginal utility of the
state at time t along the optimal trajectory. For fringe agents, λ(t) reﬂects
the highest hypothetical price at which they would be willing to pay for an
additional permit at time t.
However, the spectre of a large agent achieving a market power position
may be averted by a careful design of the cap-and-trade program. This leads
to the next section where I give hints about the goals of the regulator.
7 Critical Perspectives on Permits Allocation
I examined so far how the distribution of a large number of permits to one
agent according to current emissions may foster the emergence of market
power.
Now, I turn to the determination of the number of permits that it is
optimal to distribute to the large agent without introducing distortions from
the competitive equilibrium.
As in Eshel (2005) who demonstrates how the regulator might distribute
permits in order to restore the overall economic eﬃciency of the permits mar-
ket, I use ﬁrst comparative statics to examine the change in agents’ behaviour
induced by marginal changes in the allocation of permits. Then, I adopt the
regulator’s viewpoint (associated to the social planner) to correct the market
imperfection inherited from initial allocation in the previous example.
7.1 Comparative Statics
The eﬀects of distributing an additional permit to the large agent will be
captured by e1. In the case where µ = 0, diﬀerentiating the optimality
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The distribution of an additional permit to the large agent directly aﬀects
fringe agents’ emissions level through a variation of their marginal cost. This
result also holds in constrained regime. It may be infered optimal abatement
costs levels will only be reached in a "no market power" situation.
7.2 Social Welfare
In this model, the goal of a welfare-maximizing social regulator consists in
minimizing abatement costs of the large agent and fringe agents respectively,
and the consumer’s surplus losses from trade in the output St. The regulator
must distribute no more than e1(t)∗ to the large agent.
























where ρ represents the time preference coeﬃcient.
The change of a one-unit allocation of permit on the large agent and


















For [i = 1], I get the following results in the ﬁrst case:
∂













For [i = 2,...N], I have in both cases:
∂





In the ﬁrst case, plugging (13) and (14) in (12), at the equilibrium the
























This equality reveals the diﬀerent interests at stake when allocating per-
mits, and may be summarized as follows:
An optimal allocation rule for a social planner with perfect foresight con-
sists in distributing permits up to the point where an additional unit to the
large agent damages consumers’ surplus and establishes a dominant position
aﬀecting fringe agents’ MAC.
8 Conclusion
The description of the institutional environment on which the model hinges
provided a balanced picture of market power concerns in existing interna-
tional emissions trading schemes. As for the Kyoto Protocol, trading rules
in the making and the key role played by projections preclude from reach-
ing a deﬁnitive conclusion, but it seems overall diﬃcult to move an inter-
national permits market in a dynamic context. As for the EU ETS, the
negotiation process of each NAP is typically an example of a manipulable
rule whereby industries may conduct lobbying activities to extract more per-
mits as a monopoly rent. With reference to the debate ”rules vs. discretion”
in monetary economics, there is a need for further research to ascertain the
conditions under which it would be optimal to delegate the determination of
the cap and the distribution of permits to an independent agency. A global
conclusion concerning EU ETS market power concerns gears towards a pru-
dent approach: if some ﬁrms have received more permits than projected,
they might very well end up with a shortage of permits at the end of the ﬁrst8 CONCLUSION 25
period because of an increase in emissions. Similarly, the EU Commission is
especially careful during the validation of NAPs about their stringency and
to the fact that there will be no ex-post adjustment.
Stemming from the description of the institutional environment of current
international emissions trading schemes, I introduced a diﬀerential game with
two types of agents on a tradable permits market, diﬀering in terms of size
and permits endowment, to ascertain the conditions under which a market
power position may appear. Some similarities have been underlined between
a benchmark case where the large agent owns all the stock and the model: in
both cases where agents decide whether or not they build a permits bank, it
is possible to identify net losers (i.e., fringe agents) and a net gainer (i.e., the
large agent) as the large agent beneﬁts from a lower marginal abatement cost
than under perfect competition and is able to aﬀect negatively fringe agents’
marginal abatement costs. The model could be extended by the adoption
of an intertemporal trading ratio speciﬁc to borrowing as discussed by Kling
& Rubin (1997)33, allowing for a better grasp of the possibilities oﬀered by
intertemporal emissions trading.
But the spectre of market power need not be raised if the cap-and-trade
program appears properly designed. An optimal allocation criterion for a
welfare-maximizing social planner with perfect foresight would consist in
distributing permits to the large agent up to the threshold where it creates
consumers’ surplus losses and negative impacts on fringe agents’ marginal
abatement costs. From a Public Choice perspective, this "razor’s edge con-
dition"34 highlights the diﬃculties encountered by the European Commission
during the validation of the EU ETS Second National Allocation Plans where
each national regulator needs to arbitrate between various interests at stakes.
This debate between permits allocation and market power reveals the nec-
essary compromise35 that need to be found between various conceptions on
the role of environmental regulation.
As a ﬁnal comment, one could say a greater reliance on banking and
limited borrowing (i.e. with a speciﬁc discounting factor) should be promoted
to allow ﬁrms to smooth their emissions and take investment decisions in
abatement technologies with a better capacity to react to the evolution of
the carbon constraint over time.
33The adoption of a discount rate penalizing borrowing may remove some of the perverse
incentives whereby agents concentrate emissions on early periods, which is not socially
optimal.
34with reference to Harrod-Domar’s growth model
35This notion developed by Boltanski & Thevenot (1991) refers to core agreements
negotiated between actors.REFERENCES 26
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